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discourse, however, did not give British administrators a stable hegemony and was used by both
Waluguru and administrators in flexible ways. I shall argue that the construction and use of a
reified concept of Luguru custom can be better understood as a process of "pidginization" in
circumstances of large power differences between substrate and superstate political languages.
representation and pidginization
In Africanist historiography, "invented traditions" were first identified in order to distinguish
"authentic" ones: "invented traditions" were things against which students of African history
had to "defend" themselves in order to reach the "really pivotal" traditions of, in this case, Lozi
history (Prins 1980:8, 12). This led Prins to support Horton and Soyinka by saying that the
colonial factor was a mere "catalytic incident" in African history (1980:15), a denial of historical
change and a further reification of culture that few students of colonial history will accept.
Terence Ranger also sees invented traditions as "false models of colonial codified African
'tradition/ " but—adding that they became colonial realities (1983:212)—clearly thinks they
were more than incidental. He also interprets them, however, as an inauthentic "ideology"
imposed by colonizers and shared, against their interests, by the colonized (1983:229, 236).
The issue of the (in)authenticity of "traditions" may be more important than the emphasis on
their reification. The latter often fails to integrate analytically the interactions between colonizers
and colonized (Thomas 1992:213). It also fails to address the historical impact of a (Western)
discourse on the truth or falsity—the "authenticity"—of knowledge of other cultures within these
interactions. Contemporary apologists of indirect rule generally emphasized the necessity of
"true" representations of indigenous institutions to create legitimate rule (Cameron 1937; Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard 1940:1, 15; Malinowski 1929; Perham 1934). Critics of indirect rule
stressed the way in which European government on African lines created "false" representations
of indigenous tradition (Graham 1976; Ranger 1983). These opposed interpretations of colonial
history both rely on a discourse of representation—that is, a discourse on the truth, or falsity, of
ethnographic statements about "others."2
I submit that to understand the involvement of Waluguru and British in the implementation
of indirect rule, one should not focus on the authenticity of the content of colonial repre-
sentations but on the institution of representation (both political and textual) as such. In an
important contribution to the debate, Timothy Mitchell has argued that a Western discourse of
representation transformed Egyptian political discourse from a shifting play of difference into
an attribution of certain, unambiguous, and stable meanings to political concepts (1991:1 38):
a step toward the reification of custom and culture mentioned above. This effect is achieved
through an ordering discipline of "enframing," a method of dividing up and containing social
practices in a "neutral" space that creates the illusion of an independent, objective, or natural
system of magnitudes (1991:44-45). Enlisting Foucault in the service of Derrida, Mitchell writes
that in its way, "political power, however microphysical in its methods, operates always so as
to appear as something set apart from the real world" (1991:160; emphasis added). It does this
by creating the "theological effect" of an absent, objective referent that conceals its author and
its political authority at the same time (1991:146, 154).
Mitchell's account contains much of value, particularly when he points out the redundancy
of widely dispersed ordering and classifying activities that under colonial rule were condensed
in statistical surveys and the census (Anderson 1991; Cohn 1987; Rafael 1994). But his theory
presupposes a kind of hegemony that contains all modes of resistance "within the organizational
terrain of the colonial state" (Mitchell 1991:xi). Mitchell cannot conceive theoretically of the
interaction between a Western discourse on representation and the forms of production of
meaning that it transforms: the latter are only addressed as fundamentally "other" to the former,
which reproduces an essentialization of otherness upon which the colonial discourse that he
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The study of "colonialism" faces a paradox: while its object is increasingly recognized as
crucial to any understanding of the practice of anthropology, it has at the same time lost the
meaningful unity of a systematic and intentional project of rule (Dirks 1992:7; Thomas 1994:ix).'
While the term colonialism suggests that one can outline a certain order imposed by colonizers
on colonized societies, the study of this order unveils "tensions of empire" among colonizers
(Cooper and Stoler 1989). When the balance between strategies of coercion, persuasion,
collaboration, and resistance employed by both colonizers and colonized is drawn up,
"colonialism" fragments into contingencies (Guha 1989:230). It turns out that the concept of
"hegemony" has too often lent a spurious unity to the power relationships between colonizer
and colonized, perpetuating the failure of both colonialist and anticolonialist historiography "to
discern the anomalies that made colonialism into a figure of paradox" (Guha 1989:21 3).
The contradiction in terms of "indirect rule" exemplifies the tensions of empire (Cooper and
Stoler 1989:616), and an echo of its paradoxicality can be heard in its description as an
"invention of tradition" (Ranger 1983). But if an "invented tradition" is taken to be a successful
transformation of a politics of "competition, movement and fluidity" into a rigid code of
unchanging custom (1983:248-251), one may doubt whether the terms cover the full range of
imperial tensions, negotiations, manipulations, and paradoxes that characterized indirect rule.
In the following study of the implementation of indirect rule in the Uluguru Mountains of Eastern
Tanganyika in the 1920s and 1930s, I hope to show that it did not completely "invent" Luguru
standards of legitimate leadership and that its reified concept of Luguru "tradition" masked a
number of shifts and renegotiations, sometimes directly occasioned by the flexible use Luguru
authorities made of these "traditions." The fact that Waluguru, to this day, distinguish between
"traditional" headmen (wakubwa wajadiiand the headmen appointed by British administrators
(wandewa) makes one doubt whether the legitimacy of the invented tradition was ever accepted
and should lead us to reconsider the premises of both "invention" and "tradition" and the
hegemony that is often ascribed to them. I hope to show that, as elsewhere in Africa (cf. Fields
1985), and perhaps in all administrative ethnography (Pels and Salemink 1994:18), indirect rule
did, indeed, add a more rigid dimension to local politics. This reification of Luguru political
The analysis of the tensions of empire that characterize indirect rule is usually
hampered by the failure to study critically its discourse of representation and the
indigenous resistance and accommodation to it. In this article I make that attempt
by describing the administrative ethnography of the Uluguru Mountains in Eastern
Tanganyika as a pidgin constructed in a specific contact situation (the baraza, or
council meeting) by speakers from both the Luguru substrate or subaltern political
discourse and the British superstate language of political and ethnographic repre-
sentation, (colonial discourse, political anthropology, indirect rule, invention of
tradition, African historyl
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discourse, however, did not give British administrators a stable hegemony and was used by both
Waluguru and administrators in flexible ways. I shall argue that the construction and use of a
reified concept of Luguru custom can be better understood as a process of "pidginization" in
circumstances of large power differences between substrate and superstrate political languages.
representation and pidginization
In Africanist historiography, "invented traditions" were first identified in order to distinguish
"authentic" ones: "invented traditions" were things against which students of African history
had to "defend" themselves in order to reach the "really pivotal" traditions of, in this case, Lozi
history (Prins 1980:8, 12). This led Prins to support Morton and Soyinka by saying that the
colonial factor was a mere "catalytic incident" in African history (1980:1 5), a denial of historical
change and a further reification of culture that few students of colonial history will accept.
Terence Ranger also sees invented traditions as "false models of colonial codified African
'tradition,' " but—adding that they became colonial realities (1983:212)—clearly thinks they
were more than incidental. He also interprets them, however, as an inauthentic "ideology"
imposed by colonizers and shared, against their interests, by the colonized (1983:229, 236).
The issue of the (in)authenticity of "traditions" may be more important than the emphasis on
their reification. The latter often fails to integrate analytically the interactions between colonizers
and colonized (Thomas 1992:213). It also fails to address the historical impact of a (Western)
discourse on the truth or falsity—the "authenticity"—of knowledge of other cultures within these
interactions. Contemporary apologists of indirect rule generally emphasized the necessity of
"true" representations of indigenous institutions to create legitimate rule (Cameron 1937; Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard 1940:1, 15; Malinowski 1929; Perham 1934). Critics of indirect rule
stressed the way in which European government on African lines created "false" representations
of indigenous tradition (Graham 1976; Ranger 1983). These opposed interpretations of colonial
history both rely on a discourse of representation—that is, a discourse on the truth, or falsity, 01
ethnographic statements about "others."2
I submit that to understand the involvement of Waluguru and British in the implementation
of indirect rule, one should not focus on the authenticity of the content of colonial repre-
sentations but on the institution of representation (both political and textual) as such. In an
important contribution to the debate, Timothy Mitchell has argued that a Western discourse of
representation transformed Egyptian political discourse from a shifting play of difference into
an attribution of certain, unambiguous, and stable meanings to political concepts (1991:138):
a step toward the reification of custom and culture mentioned above. This effect is achieved
through an ordering discipline of "enframing," a method of dividing up and containing social
practices in a "neutral" space that creates the illusion of an independent, objective, or natural
system of magnitudes (1991:44-45). Enlisting Foucault in the service of Derrida, Mitchell writes
that in its way, "political power, however microphysical in its methods, operates always so as
to appear as something set apart from the real world" (1991:160; emphasis added). It does this
by creating the "theological effect" of an absent, objective referent that conceals its author and
its political authority at the same time (1991:146, 154).
Mitchell's account contains much of value, particularly when he points out the redundancy
of widely dispersed ordering and classifying activities that under colonial rule were condensed
in statistical surveys and the census (Anderson 1991; Cohn 1987; Rafael 1994). But his theory
presupposes a kind of hegemony that contains all modes of resistance "within the organizational
terrain of the colonial state" (Mitchell 1991:xi). Mitchell cannot conceive theoretically of the
interaction between a Western discourse on representation and the forms of production of
meaning that it transforms: the latter are only addressed as fundamentally "other" to the former,
which reproduces an essentialization of otherness upon which the colonial discourse that he
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criticizes also relied.3 Mitchell's account perhaps incorporates a microphysics of European
discipline as it was intended to be imposed on Egyptian society, but he leaves out the
microphysics of colonial contact that mediated the transformation of indigenous social practice
by European "representation" and "discipline" (Hirschkind 1991).
Thus, despite Mitchell's innovative stress on the dominance of a discourse of representation,
as in many accounts of indirect rule (e.g., Fields 1985; Graham 1976; Ranger 1983),4 he seems
unable to conceive of an interaction between dominant and subordinate discursive practices.
If we want to maintain a focus on the relocations and restrictions of indigenous political
discourse produced by the ethnographic representations of indirect administration, it might be
better to follow the lead of Johannes Fabian (1978:317) and regard this ethnography as a
"pidgin" constructed in the interaction between substrate and superstrate political languages.
The pidgin, while being a creative proliferation o( meaning in the context of linguistic interaction
as a whole, may appear as a "restricted" development when measured against either the
substrate or the superstrate language.
The study of pidgins and Creoles has departed from the evolutionary model that posited the
transformation from an unstable, restricted, artificial second language—the pidgin—into a
stable, elaborated, more natural "mother tongue"—the Creole (lourdan 1991:192, 194). The
model of a restricted and artificial language development broke down in the face of research
emphasizing the importance of substrate languages, the social contexts in which pidgins and
Creoles are produced, and the diversity of speakers' linguistic praxis (1991:188-189). Christine
lourdan concludes that one can distinguish between pidgins, Creoles, and other languages by
taking as criteria the nature of the contact situation and the type of language transmission to
other generations (1991:190). On that basis, a pidgin can be identified as a second language to
speakers from both substrate and superstrate languages (Jourdan 1991:194). It is created by
eliminating those forms of the sub- and superstrate languages that speakers regard as anomalous
to the functioning ot the pidgin as a communicative system (1991:195).
All this is remarkably like the invented traditions of administrative ethnography. Poised
between the superstrate discourse on (political) representation and the substrate indigenous
political language, administrative ethnography developed on the basis of creative negotiation
between agents of both discursive communities. Like a pidgin, however, it is also the product
of a balance of power and of global and local inequalities between languages (see Asad 1986).
This administrative ethnography can be identified by its contact situation—the preterrain
(forefield) of British administrative anthropology and Luguru political practice, as it became
discursively realized at the ethnographic occasion of the baraza or council meeting—and by
its transmission by bureaucratic reproduction.5 This pidgin of Luguru politics was "restricted"
because it realized only selected elements from British administrative doctrine and Luguru
politics, yet in practical interaction it complicated and fractured both and therefore also enriched
both.
In the following pages, I first describe the superstrate political discourse of tribal representation
characteristic of Tanganyikan indirect rule (its administrative anthropology) and show that it
was internally fractured by suppositions about "good" and "other" government. Second, I hope
to show that the substrate or subaltern political discourse of Waluguru was also internally
divided between a stable lineage politics and discourse on initiation and a more fluid negotiation
of "big man" positions based on rainmaking and other magical capacities (a reversal of the
situation in Usambara so aptly recorded by Feierman [1990]). Finally, I hope to show through
what kind of social mediations the pidgin—the administrative ethnography of Uluguru—was
brought into being, how its paradoxical development depended on both the substrate and
sujjerstrate political discourses, and why the latter can be interpreted (but not understood) as a
prophylactic device that tried to ensure the absenceof the administrator from Luguru politics—a
paradoxical situation eminently characteristic of indirect rule.
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indirect rule as administrative anthropology
It has been argued that the decision to rule through indigenous authorities in Africa was an
economical one based on the scarcity of personnel and that, in consequence, the doctrine of
indirect rule had little impact when adopted (Fields 1985:32, 41). But in Tanganyika, if not
elsewhere, the introduction of indirect rule enabled the state to penetrate society far deeper
than before (Iliffe 1979:325). This was the result of a language of "tribal" representation that,
although it had roots in British Indian colonial society, had developed into a distinct, British-
African, political anthropology by the time Donald Cameron implemented it as governor of
Tanganyika in 1925.
Although Cameron partly learned his trade when acting as chief secretary to Frederick Lugard
in Nigeria, he departed from the latter's policy of calculated noninterference. Lugard's first
interest was to extend military rule—rule by conquest—in a downward direction, that is, to
delegate his own authority to native chiefs rather than incorporating theirs (Lugard as quoted
in Kirk-Greene 1965:45). In Nigeria, Lugard did not advocate "ruling on African principles,"
the benevolent protection of native life and the institution of Native Treasuries characteristic of
later forms of indirect rule; these were added by subordinate officers inspired by British Indian
examples and were vehemently opposed by Lugard (Flint 1978:302-304; Gailey 1974:11;
Kirk-Greene 1965:9-11).6 Instead, Cameron's propensity for anthropological research stems
from Lugard's successor as governor of Nigeria, Hugh Clifford, who inherited it from Malayan
exemplars, the indirect rule of Rajah Brooke, and Hugh Low in particular/ When Cameron was
appointed governor of Tanganyika in 1925, he insisted, like Clifford, on the necessity of guiding
African political evolution, a task that rarely occupied Lugard during his Nigerian years (Gailey
1974:115).
Thus Cameron arrived in Tanganyika in April 1925 with an administrative anthropology
largely derived from South (East) Asian colonial rule, a tradition that was both at the roots of
and in tension with the budding anthropological profession in Britain." I lis predecessor, Horace
Byatt, left Cameron with sufficient staff and revenue for the large-scale administrative reform
(Gailey 1974:36), which was thought necessary for the purpose of undoing Byatt's ambiguous
policy of nominally instituting indirect rule through "tribal" chiefs while at the same time
retaining the "nontribal" akida appointed by the Germans. This gave Cameron the additional
opportunity to centralize the administration (Ingham 1965:547-552) and wrest the initiative
from a group of senior officers, accustomed to the velvet glove of Byatt, who had already started
to implement indirect rule after Byatt's departure.9 The most forceful personality among them
was Charles Dundas, who was as dedicated as Cameron to the promotion of African interests.10
Dundas was appointed the first secretary of native affairs of Tanganyika, but he did not get along
very well with Cameron. Both agreed on the necessity of ethnography for native administration,
but Cameron was dogmatic in his insistence on a theory of "tribes" held together by chieftain-
ships, while Dundas argued that "chiefs" were hard to find in many Tanganyikan societies.
To appreciate this conflict in the administrative hierarchy, and its influence on indirect rule
in Uluguru, it is necessary to emphasize again that Cameron substituted the Lugardian
delegation of authority to chiefs by the incorporation of mechanisms of tribal cohesion. The
political evolution that this implied was to be achieved by a process of development from the
tribal constitution of the past to local government on British lines in the future, under the advice
and control of British officers. In this process the recognition of the present ruler was less
important than research into the past tribal constitution, and interference by the political officer
was necessary." The latter emphasis was a result of his commitment to two specific ideas: the
akida myth and his theory of tribal cohesion. Cameron thought the Germans had intentionally
destroyed indigenous institutions by imposing rule through an akida, who was an alien to the
tribe concerned and therefore lacked a traditional position of authority. Lugard preserved
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chiefship by deposing the rulers of Northern Nigeria only to reinstate their relatives later on, but
Cameron did not expect to find institutions worth preserving in existence. While his dogmatic
view of Tanganyikan history made it imperative to do research, not all of Cameron's officers
agreed with it (Gailey 1974:79).u The akida myth provided a scapegoat to which the "defects
or weaknesses" of indirect rule could be attributed.13 It also emphasized the urgency with which
it had to be instituted: to counter the threat of leaderless and uncontrolled, detribalized natives,
Cameron's subordinates had to work, to work fast, and on the lines set out by him. This sense
of urgency was created by the theory of tribal rule in which Cameron believed and that forms
the core of his anthropology.
Unlike the early Lugard, Cameron did not legitimate rule by conquest.14 Conquest, including
the imposition of purely British standards of government, would create the desire among
Africans to take over government. This would turn them into "bad imitations" of Europeans, a
phenomenon that Cameron thought was the cause of nationalist troubles in Egypt and India.
To Cameron, the "Good African" was an African "from the bottom," still in touch with traditional
ways of life and giving his allegiance to his "natural leaders," the chiefs. If the chiefs were
incorporated into the system of administration and Africans given an immediate share in their
own government, they would perhaps seek more independence—but not on the side of the
modern political agitator.15
Although Cameron would later acknowledge that chieftaincy was not the only principle of
Tanganyikan politics, in 1926, when he published his Native Authority Ordinance, he was
convinced that the office of a Native Authority "normally consists of a hereditary tribal chief,
almost invariably in association with certain elders and other persons who occupy positions of
dignity and responsibility." Despite Dundas's conviction (in 1925) that there were societies in
Tanganyika that had never developed institutions of chiefship and were only "democratic and
patriarchal," Cameron was at that time far from acknowledging the "essential democracy" of
Bantu society that the Tanganyika government claimed before the Permanent Mandates
Commission in 1929 (Ingham 1965:567). Tribal consent was, in the words of the East Africa
Commission, to be based on the acknowledgment that "hereditary right to authority is an idea
still generally recognized in the African mind." Thus Cameron and his officers could switch at
will from "tribal institutions" to "tribal constitutions," because institutions were conceived in a
legalist sense, as ideas or laws shared by all members of the tribe.16 The customs of the tribe
were the laws of succession and the laws of succession were hereditary. If Africans did not have
their legitimate, hereditary chiefs, tribal organization would be destroyed. Therefore every
improvement the administration wanted to make in native society depended on the quality of
the chiefs. That meant that the sons of chiefs had to be educated in order to modernize native
society; moreover, "extra-tribal" forms of organization such as those created by missionaries
had to be guarded so as not to develop into something "political."17
It is crucial to realize the paradoxical aspects of this attempt to find a baseline for political
evolution (compare to Flint 1978:301). By formulating a conception of an "other" politics,
Cameron implicated himself in a hierarchy of standards different from that of British politics
(Fields 1985). "Representation" of the majority, for instance, could not be the result of elections
on European lines—this would merely give room to the agitator. Instead, the chief was supposed
to represent his people by their recognition of his hereditary authority.18 But that implied that
Cameron had to caution his officers not to insist on "the highest standards of English public life,"
because, were they to do so, they could urge measures that threatened tribal organization. For
the appointment of chiefs three principles applied: personal ability, hereditary or traditional
right and custom, and the will of the people. The first had to be ignored most often, for "nothing
short of republican government will ensure that a ruler is always a capable man."19 Deposition
of a chief on the grounds of incompetence meant nothing less than that hereditary or lawful
succession was disallowed. "Therewith the foundation of the tribal organization is undermined
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and Chiefs become purely government servants. Therefore rejection on this score must be based
on stronger grounds than mere inferiority of intellect and character not amounting to absolute
incapacity." Because "hereditary and traditional right substantiates personal claim and warrants
the assumption that the people approve," it was clear that of the three principles "hereditary or
traditional right" had to be the major one.20
Hereditary succession was, of course, not foreign to British politics: it was part and parcel of
the aristocratic discourse surrounding the cult of the gentleman. A second aspect of the
accommodation to the "African" atmosphere was derived from British public school practice:
the emphasis on the "responsibility" of and the "delegation of authority" by the chiefs resembled
the ideology of the prefect system. As teachers supervised the prefects, so chiefs had to supervise
their subchiefs and administrators their chiefs (Heussler 1963:96-98; Ranger 1983:216). A third
aspect of accommodation—and a most successful one—was the fusion of legislative, executive,
and judicial functions of government in the office of the chief, another aspect of colonial rule
that had been previously tested in India and that was perceived as a pre-Montesquieuian phase
of political evolution. Cameron dismissed Chief Justice Russell's protests against severing the
connection between native courts and the High Court. Chiefs became the judges of the native
courts, in which no barristers (even Africans) could appear in a professional capacity (Moffett
1952:19).21
The urgency Cameron felt on account of this theory of tribal representation is made clear by
the institution of indirect rule in Uluguru: Chief Muhina Goso Kingo of Northern Uluguru and
Chief Kingalu Mwanamfuko of Southern Uluguru were both installed (replacing the akida of
their territory) in June 1925, before Cameron asked his District officers to compile notes on the
"original constitution" of the tribes in their districts (in September 1925). Although Dundas,
supported by the Morogoro District Officer, E. E. Hutchins, proposed a different arrangement
after some research had been done, Cameron ignored the anomalies posed for his theory by
the fact that Kingo was a conqueror of Northern Uluguru, while Kingalu was in no sense a
hereditary chief of South Uluguru. Kingalu was to continue as chief until his deposition in
1936.22 Eventually, Dundas had to pay for his opposition to Cameron's theory: his career
suffered considerably and lagged behind that of his former assistant, Philip Mitchell.J3
Administrative communication was not only hampered by dogmatism at the top but also by
(mis)interpretation further down the administrative hierarchy. Many of the subtleties introduced
by Cameron in indirect rule doctrine did not reach the lower levels of the administration. F. J.
E. Bagshawe, as Provincial Commissioner of the Southern Highlands, issued the following
instructions to his subordinates:
Each tribe must be considered a distinct unit. . . . Tribal boundaries must be settled. Each tribe must be
under a chief.... The wishes of the whole people must be taken under consideration.. . . Remember
always that a chief is a native, with a native's partially developed sense of right and wrong, passions and
temptations. Remember that he is your principal weapon in your work and that if he breaks you will have
to make another.... Chiefs must be made to understand that we are increasing their power and paying
them salaries and in return we expect a great deal more from them. [Graham 1976:4)
The martial analogies, the sense of European superiority, and the clear emphasis on chiefs as
collaborators with the administration, instead of hereditary representatives of their people, show
that sometimes there was not much difference between the chief and the akida (Graham 1976:4)
and that Lugard's conceptions of authority might still recur among Cameron's subordinates. This
was partly the result of the exigencies of administration, which asked for hurried "either-or"
decisions instead of painstaking ethnography. As we will see, however, it was less a lack of
knowledge as such than the absence of reflection on the way in which ethnographic
representations were constructed that made a crucial difference for the construction of indirect
rule in Uluguru.
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clans and big men in Luguru political discourse
To understand how indirect rule transformed Luguru political discourse, it is necessary to
construct an image of the substrate or subaltern political language that can be contrasted with
the "traditional" politics invented by the British. This contrast is more complex than Ranger's
juxtaposition of "competition, movement and fluidity" with a rigid administrative code
(1983:248). Administrators usually talked of the Luguru "clan system," while later ethnographers
used Evans-Pritchard's "segmentary lineage system" (Young and Fosbrooke 1960:39) or one of
its modifications (such as the "sub-clan" system [Brain 1973:114)) to conceive of the unity of
Luguru society. These conceptions were legalistic and reified descent categories predicated, for
instance, on the argument that lineage discourse leads to ever-increasing segmentation (Young
and Fosbrooke 1960:70-71) or to straightforward progression, without choice or political
struggle, to a lineage headmanship (Brain 1973:114). These administrators ignored Evans-
Pritchard's idea that talk of lineages was also a way to discuss other principles of organization
(1940:143)—that, in other words, descent categories were a discourse through which political
and economic relations were organized and discussed.
Luguru lineages are traced back 1 5 generations at most, and these genealogies legitimize the
position of the present lineage head, who embodies the power of these ancestors. Descent
categories also help to organize relations of production and the exchange of labor.24 This does
not exclude that some lines of descent are fictitious, and Waluguru clearly distinguish between
tracing descent through the female line and tracing it through classificatory kinship (in particular
through adopted sister's sons, the wapwa wa kukaribisha). There is therefore room for political
maneuvering within lineage relationships—for struggles between parallel lines of descent,
between generations, and between men and women—but relationships are never only decided
by the skills of the Machiavellian political entrepreneur central to transactionalist analyses (see
Thoden van Velzen 1973). Beyond the realm of lineage discourse, however, a political
entrepreneur's economic, military, and magical sources of power could well stake out a
temporary "big man" position.
This small-scale form of political organization evidently fit a society that, in very recent
history, had been composed of small groups of travelers. Threatened by drought, famine, or
war, the people who during colonial times were to be named "Waluguru" fled into the
mountains in the beginning of the 19th century.'5 Even there they were harassed by Wambunga
warriors, Arab slavers, or internecine warfare often caused by the intervention of one or both
of these groups. Waluguru commonly refer to the period before the Germans both as wakati
wa Wambunga and as wakati wa Waarabu, as Wambunga raids and alliances between Luguru
headmen and slave-raiding Arabs took place at the same time. Waluguru seem to have come
from all points of the compass (Mzuanda 1958:7 et passim), but their linguistic similarity to
coastal peoples suggests that a majority came from the Eastern plains of Uzaramo and Ukwere.26
In the process those Waluguru who possessed cattle lost them through east coast fever, and they
settled down to a purely agricultural economy.
District Commissioner Hutchins's encounter with the Waluguru in 1925-26 took the follow-
ing ethnographic form:
The tribal system is a clan system (UKOO), which is the strongest I have met with. The people have always
paid more attention lo their clan-heads than to the German-imposed Jumbea, Marriage within a clan is
absolutely forbidden. . . . Feeling between the various clans is still very strong and is mainly caused by
jealousy. It is this interclan antagonism that has been so dit'ficult to contend with in our efforts to
re-establish the old system of tribal administration. It seems as it' the family unit were the basis of
organization, the elder of the family being appealed to in any matter requiring arbitration. This would
also seem to be the foundation unit of (he village and the latter to have grown round it. As descent in the
tribe is rnatrilineal the growth ol'the family into the villages has been a natural outcome of the spread of
family trees. Thus the family-head also grew into the village head, and, from arbitrating in purely family
affairs he came to be the judge upon all village matters.
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This practice still continues and would appear to suit the immediate needs of the people. It would be
a grave mistake to deprive these elders of their powers within the villages, nor would the people wish
them to be so deprived. Over each group of villages is an hereditary Ndewa [s/c| who rules a small district
and is the head of the people living within its boundaries, but further than (his tribal organization did not
originally go. There seem to have been no cohesion amongst the various Wandewa, nor any of a higher
standing than the others. Later on, as ihe successful rainmaker became more powerful, he gradually look
over the control of the Wandewa in his particular sphere of work and this appears to have been the way
that the families of Kingalo [sic], Hega and Mwanambago gradually became chiefs in iheir respective
areas.27
Hutchins was correct in stating that the largest formal unit of organization was the area under
the nominal authority of an original landholder (mwenye saku or mndewa, plural: wenye .saA-i/j,
and that none of them was capable of exercising substantial authority over the others. His
description, however, strongly oversimplified the situation. Moreover, his statement is framed
by Cameron's theory of political evolution, according to which the family unit evolved
gradually, by the logical extension of family trees and the growth of numbers, into a village,
while a group of villages would eventually submit (by consent or by force) to a chief, whose
prominence was based on martial and rainmaking powers.28 The theory suggested that an
emerging rainmaker would eventually occupy a position as politically stable and secure as that
of the existing, less-powerful headmen.
When asked, "Who is your chief?" a Mluguru would name a lesser headman, the landholder
(mwenye issi [Kiluguru]; mwenye nchi [Swahili]) of the area around one or several hamlets, an
area often inhabited by people belonging to one lineage (tombo [Kiluguru), "breast"; ziwa
ISwahili]) and some of their affines. The mwenye issi was a first among equals, and his position
was legitimated by the genealogy of his ancestors, counted Irom the first to settle in that specific
area. The recitation of the genealogy of landholders (all of whom took the name of the first upon
accession to office) was first of all a claim to land; second, it was a claim to prominence in that
area of a specific lineage or clan; and only in the last resort was it a claim to authority over all
people occupying that land. In a larger unit of territory, usually a mountain valley, several wenye
issi would be the nominal inferiors of the original landholder (mwenye saku or mndewa),•"' the
one whose ancestor cleared the first patch of land and thereby established the claim of his clan
(lukolo iKiluguru]; ukoo [Swahili]) to that valley; but in practice, they were both advisors and
competitors. The people settling on that land, however, were never merely (bio)logical exten-
sions of the family that had settled there first. The concept of lukolo allowed the landholder to
accept nominal sister's sons and their families and give them room to settle in the valley.i() Thus,
contrary to Hutchins's view, the authority of an original landholder was never merely authority
over his direct descendants, and lineage discourse could be used both to subdivide territorial
groups (in lineages) and to enlarge them (by adoption into the clan).
The order of succession to a landholder's name was never a fixed and logical matri lineal form
of descent. Figure 1 displays the possibilities for negotiation. Supposing (1) is the ruling mwenye
issi, (2) would be the ideal heir after his death or deposition, or (3) when there are no brothers.
Generally, however, a group of women of the lineage—(a) or her mother the most prominent
among them—decided whether a candidate was really suitable for the post. They could bypass
(2) and (3) and give the name to (4) if he was old enough. An important consideration in this
decision was whether the wife of the candidate was also suitable for high office, as she received
the same rank as her husband. If (5) inherited the name, however, the chance for fission would
increase because of the possibility that the eldest lineage (tombo dikulu [Kiluguru], or "big
breast") would at some point in time claim back the right to the name from a middle lineage
(tombo magati, or "breast in between") or the youngest (tombo dudogo, or "little breast"). This
essential negotiability of descent categories is also apparent from the fact that, at some points
in Luguru history, one finds the sons of important headmen taking up a temporary post of
prominence and even attempting to change matrilineal into patrilineal descent (and thus to
objectify their right to rule).31
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Figure 1. Luguru kinship discourse. The diagram represents an ideal sequence of succession to male lineage
and/or clan headmanship and some alternatives in the selection of suitable candidates. The black
symbols indicate a member of a different clan. The order of birth is from left to right.
The integration of these political bodies was further enhanced by the practice of initiation.
For Luguru boys, the entrance into the adult world was organized by the inhabitants of the valley
or a smaller unit, depending on the power of the landholding clan. Girls were initiated
individually or in twos and threes, emphasizing the prominence of the lineage (Pels, in press:
chs. 3 and 4). Access to valley politics was also determined by initiation into the local society
of wenye mlungn ("those who possess ancestral emblems"), a group of elders (male and female)
that included members of other clans, a practice that acknowledged the local influence of the
other clans while at the same time tying them to the landholding clan by the magical secrets
shared among these initiates.3- In this way, the tenants on another clan's land (wapangaji)could
enter the political arena.
Landholders were the judges in matters of land and other disputes. They guarded relationships
with the ancestors and, through them, regulated agricultural affairs in order to ensure a good
harvest (always, however, in consultation with other elders). While a mwenye issi of a specific
hamlet would guard the land of his own lineage, the mwenye saku would allocate land to
newcomers in the valley as a whole, serve as a court of appeal, and be called upon to act in
cases of lack of rain, locust plagues, epidemic illnesses, and other disasters due to the wrath of
ancestors. (Before Europeans intervened he also made war medicine.) The secrets of his magical
capabilities would be passed on to him when he took the name of his ancestor and received
his regalia on accession to office. Since the settlement of the Uluguru mountains, several of the
wenye saku had built up reputations bigger than others: the most important of these were
Bambarawe in Matombo, Kingalu in Kinole, Hega in Kolero, and Mbago in Mgeta area (see
Figure 2). This was partly due to their claim of possessing a place of reconciliation with ancestral
or nature-spirits (fa/nbf'/coJthat had far more power for making war- or rain-magic than did others.
They nonetheless never attained a position that gave them direct authority over another clan,
or another lineage, except when it was of the same clan in the same area.
Hutchins called these big rainmakers "chiefs" and in the autumn of 1925 suggested that both
Mbago and Hega should be enthroned as equals to Kingalu, who was already chief of the former
akidatoi Mkuyuni. (Hutchins seems to have forgotten Bambarawe, possibly because he thought
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Figure 2. Uluguru Mountains and environs.
that Bambarawe no longer exercised his rainmaking functions after having become a Catho-
lic—which was not the case.) But these influential headmen can be better understood as big
men (wakubwa) who had risen to prominence by the successful manipulation of the magical,
economic, and military sources at their command. Some of them drew on resources from outside
the mountains: Mbago MwanaMatolola and Kingalu Fimbombili are on record as using their
traffic with the coastal Arabs to their advantage (Mzuanda 1958:27-31; Wendelini
n.d.:43-44).33 Two different stories of the original settlement of Kinole area by the first Kingalu,
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however, will show what indigenous political strategies were available to Waluguru beyond
lukolo discourse.
The two versions of the story share the same outline: Mleke MwanaMsumi and his sister
Mkirindila were on their way from the Nyingwa-Kibungo area to look for new land in the Kinole
area (see Figure 2).34 When they camped in that area, they were discovered by the local leader,
Magoma, who was of a different clan.35 Magoma immediately suspected evil intentions and
went out to meet Mleke with a force. Mleke, however, managed to convince him of his peaceful
intentions, they became friends, and, while Mleke got a piece of land from Magoma, Magoma
married Mkirindila. Mkirindila, however, was asked by Mleke to spy on Magoma. When Mleke's
army was ready and he knew all secrets of Magoma, he treacherously attacked him and drove
him from Kinole. Subsequently, Mleke changed his name to Kingalungalu, the fickle one, which
was later shortened to Kingalu. Kingalu continued with warfare, attacking his brother or,
alternatively, his father, who still lived in the Nyingwa-Kibungo area, but he was killed, also
through treason, and his people were driven back to Kinole.
The meeting between Mleke and Magoma is of great interest because the two versions of the
story differ considerably. In the Kibungo version, told to an African priest (see Mzuanda 1958)
by people of that area, Mleke says he wants to be friends and Magoma naively believes him
and gives him a piece of land. Only after two years does Magoma decide to take a Mlambena
(daughter of the Bena clan, like Mkirindila) as his wife.36 In the other version, which James Brain
got from one of the sons of Kingalu Mwanarubela at Kinole, the interaction is pictured rather
differently. On his arrival at Mleke's camp, Magoma first inquires whether he has evil intentions,
and, after Mleke's denial, spends some time talking. The next day he returns and is given maize
beer—a considerable gift, because beer (pombe) has a pivotal role in ritual and social action.
The story emphasizes that to Magoma and his people maize beer is an innovation. Magoma
spends the night at Mleke's camp and during the next day sees Mleke's sister Mkirindila and
asks for her hand in marriage. Mleke consents (another gift); after staying for some time with
Mleke, Magoma leaves with his bride. )ust before their departure, Mleke instructs his sister to
spy on Magoma.
Significantly, in the Kibungo version (which derived from a group hostile to the imperial
claims of Kingalu and his supporters), Magoma is an innocent who gives a gift and gets treason
in return. In the Kinole version, it is Mleke who starts giving (first a novel way of preparing beer,
then his sister) and Magoma responds by allowing him to stay on his land. Like a good
son-in-law, Magoma stays with Mleke—uxorilocally—but then anomalously departs for his own
home. It is only when Magoma departs with his bride that Mleke starts his treason. Moreover,
in the Kinole version Kingalungalu starts making war on his brother only after the latter had
insulted his sister's son's wives (who are, nominally, Kingalu's wives), while, in the Kibungo
version, he makes war on his father, headman of Kibungo, without any reason—an unforgivable
act of disrespect.
Essential to an understanding of Luguru political process is that both versions of this story
relate a form of contact between members of different clans. The clans have no necessary
relationship with each other, and it is significant that in this interclan context Kingalungalu, the
fickle one, becomes a nom de guerre. Brain rightly remarks that among Waluguru cunning
(ujanja) is something to be admired (1971:831 ).37 Although someone who gains his objectives
by cunning alone does not deserve respect, many Waluguru are conscious that, in political
realms where relationships of descent and respect no longer provide a more or less sufficient
check on individual initiative, no one is to be trusted.
F. C. Bailey's treacherous "clever leader" (1969:61), however, is not simply the "norm" for
Luguru politics outside the politics organized by the discourse on clans and lineages. There are
many examples of different clans that coexist peacefully. Lukolo discourse could also serve to
co-opt new members into a body politic: the majority of landholders in the valley of Konde had
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once been adopted bythemwenyesaku, Lwango, as nominal sister's sons, perhaps to strengthen
the Mwenda clan against attacks by its powerful neighbor, Bambarawe.38 Moreover, it would
be naive to think that the politics of give-and-take, threat, and treason were restricted to
relationships between people who did not share a line of descent: members of the same clan,
(but different lineages) or members of the same lineage, also had to consider gift giving, magical
threat, or physical power among themselves. If such internal quarrels were usually addressed
in the idiom of witchcraft, that idiom itself shaded imperceptibly into the idiom of war- and
rain-magic of interclan rivalry (Pels, in press: ch. 6). The difference between intraclan and
interclan politics arose mainly from the dominance established by elders—men in particular—in
education, initiation, and marriage negotiations. This dominance found its most concentrated
expression in the practices of initiation specific to a certain group, and it was legitimated by
lukolo discourse.
Thus we can distinguish two registers of Luguru political discourse: one characterized by the
concepts of lukolo authority, and another that allowed for the Machiavellian machinations of
big men. As the story of Kingalu I makes clear, the latter register was also discursively regulated
(by the right ways of giving a gift, of granting hospitality, and of marriage exchange) although
it was not stabilized by the magical sources of clan and lineage authority that underpinned the
position of a landholder—which, if violated, would incur the wrath of the ancestors to the
detriment of the whole hamlet. Beyond the influence of ancestral authority, no enduring vertical
relationships were maintained, and those landholders who managed to rise above their fellows
can be designated as "big men." Their superior status was firmly tied to their personal initiative
and could not easily be objectified to such an extent that it could be passed on to iheir
successors. Ironically, the British directed most of their efforts at introducing hereditary chiefship
into the latter sphere, where Luguru ideas about hereditary power did not apply.
the safari method and the pidginization of Luguru politics
In order to assess the interaction of the languages of indirect rule and Luguru politics, it is
insufficient to concentrate on the texts of Luguru administrative ethnography alone (Pels 1994).
To identify the latter as a pidgin in relation to its substrate and superstrate languages, one must
focus on the practice of the production of administrative knowledge about Uluguru. What can
be called a "safari method" underlay both major efforts in the administrative ethnography of
Uluguru, Hutchins's "Tribal History and Legends," and F. J. E. Bagshawe's "Land Development
Survey Report." Fortunately, Bagshawe kept a diary, recording his tour of Uluguru in minute
detail.39 The tour was a common practice of all Cameron's officers, who administered a district
while traveling through it, calling together a council meeting (baraza), and, when finished,
packing up and leaving for the next rural center. For ethnographic work, the administrators
simply had to invert the council meeting: during a normal meeting, the Officer spoke and the
Africans (chiefs, subchiefs, headmen) asked questions or nodded assent, while during ethno-
graphic study it was the officer who asked questions and nodded assent when and where the
answers to his questions confirmed what he wanted to hear.
A council meeting proceeded in Swahili, not Kiluguru; thus, to be able to speak Swahili was
a sine qua non for administrative office, a criterion not explicitly recognized by the British.
Despite any hereditary claim to authority, widespread popularity, or proven competency, a
headman who spoke only Kiluguru could not get a government job. Like Kingalu Mwanarubela,
Bagshawe's main conversation partner in the following account, Waluguru who were successful
in government jobs were usually former servants of Europeans, proficient in Swahili, and inured
to a routine of command and obedience. When Bagshawe set off on his tour in December 1929,
his assignment was to find out whether, given the nature of Luguru land tenure, land could be
alienated and sold to nonnative settlers. Moreover, he wanted to check the ethnographic
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material that District Commissioner Hutchins (according to Bagshawe "an over-stalwart fellow
running to fat which has penetrated to his brain") had gathered in the Morogoro District Book
since 1925, and on which the implementation of indirect rule in Uluguru was based.
His first stop was the resthouse in Mkuyuni, headquarters of Kingalu Mwanarubela, then Chief
(sultani) of South Uluguru. Kingalu, together with his son Omari, the subchief (mtawala) of
Mkuyuni and several headmen (wandewa), soon joined Bagshawe in a council meeting.
Although Bagshawe did not record in his diary the talk during that first baraza, after another
talk with Kingalu and Omari the next day he wrote: "Most disappointing, as I find that most of
what I wrote yesterday is wrong! I took for granted a lot in the district record book & Kingalo
[s/c] said 'ndio' (yes/pp) to everything! Curse it." Kingalu had obviously been on his guard on
that first day, probing Bagshawe's mind and trying to ascertain what it was that he wanted to
hear. After the previous day's chat about his work as a servant to a German official and his
voicing complaints about traveling allowances, Kingalu must have found out that Bagshawe
was out for something new and that he did not merely want to reproduce the district book's
statements. On this second day, unencumbered by the presence of headmen who might dispute
his claims, he told Bagshawe the story of his ancestor Kingalu I's conquest of Kinole (as recorded
in the previous section), and added that the whole of Southern Uluguru—including Mgeta,
Matombo, and Kolero—submitted to Kingalu I.
Bagshawe recognized Kingalu's strategy ("[his claims], I think, will be disputed"), probably
assisted by Hutchins's account of the equal status of the chiefs of Kolero (Hega) and Mgeta
(Mbago).40 Despite his doubts about Kingalu's claims, Bagshawe nevertheless wrote that
Kingalu's appointment "was wise. It is accepted cheerfully by the people and there is no
apparent friction with any of the Sub-Chiefs though possibly his appointment was accepted
grudgingly by Hega and Mbago in the beginning."41 But Bagshawe was taking a snapshot of a
political process that had been in motion for some time, and Kingalu skillfully manipulated
Bagshawe's safari method in order to set the frame and contents of the picture. Just as speakers
from substrate and superstrate languages creatively construct a pidgin in specific contact
situations and by specific means of transmission to other generations, so Kingalu and Bagshawe
coo|x;rated (albeit for different reasons) to select a number of political representations by means
of a contact situation (the safari method) and a form of transmission of its results (bureaucratic
writing). Part of the result, however, was to keep large chunks of Luguru political practice out
of the administrator's eye.
In the mountains a political struggle went on that largely escaped Bagshawe's method of
gathering information. Kingalu Mwanarubela had, shortly after succeeding his deceased uncle
in August 1927, attacked the positions of his potential rivals by subordinating his subchiefs
Mbago and Hega to the control of an assistant and by diminishing the headmanship of subchief
Bambarawe's son to half its size.42 Moreover, only six years after Bagshawe's survey, District
Commissioner Hutchins had to ask for sanction from the Governor to depose Kingalu:
The Chief is greedy and unscrupulous and the sole reason why his subjects have accepted his abuses
without complaint for so long is because of the power he holds over them as a rain-doctor, which practice
he has never abandoned. Whilst liltle could be definitely proved against him, whispers of his malpractices
are becoming increasingly audible, and I have little doubt but that the majority of his subjects will breathe
a sigh of relief when his reign comes to an end.4'
The Governor agreed, and the process of assessing the administrative capacities of Kingalu's
heir, his nephew Gungurugwa, and the claims of his rivals was started. Kingalu's subchiefs were
very diffident about having to express their preferences, and, although they chose Gungurugwa,
Hutchins could not but feel that it was not "in agreement with the wishes of the majority."
Gungurugwa, on the other hand, knew that, when appointed, he would be no more than a
figurehead for his deposed uncle.44 Hutchins proposed to his Provincial Commissioner to
amalgamate North and South Uluguru under the Chief of North Uluguru, Muhina Goso Kingo,
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and went on leave. The Provincial Commissioner encountered the same confusion in trying to
assess who really represented the wishes of the majority, and, after a number of unsatisfactory
and mutually contradicting council meetings, the majority of subchiefs and headmen expressed
themselves in favor of the government's choice; in due time Kingo became the first Chief of the
whole of Uluguru.45
The British attempts to second-guess at the whispers of the majority, and the hesitation of
Waluguru to choose between "hereditary" claims to office and the wishes of the government,
indicate an element of the substrate or subaltern politics that helped to construct—yet did not
appear in—administrative ethnography. Waluguru often told me of the necessity of having a
"cool heart" (moyo baridi) in dealing with other people. A responsible leader had been taught
to suppress moto ("fire," but also "anger," "desire," or "aggression"), because it could never
lead to agreement in relations with others, or, more significant, to harmony with the ancestors
(mizimu), who prefer coolness, tranquility, and shade to sun and exertion. Contradicting another
person was a gesture of moto that befitted neither leaders nor their subordinates. Kingnlu,
Bambarawe, Mbago, and Hega embodied some of the most important spirits in Eastern Uluguru
and could anger them—their source of power and authority—in contradicting each other. They
might provoke a showdown of power, unleashing magical forces that none ot them wanted to
confront.46 And, of course, it was neither necessary nor advisable to unveil one's political
strategies for a chief or his white superior—they were better kept to oneself. We only have to
think of Kingalu saying "ndio" to everything Bagshawe suggested on the first day of the visit to
understand how elementary this reticence was in Luguru politics.
Kingalu adroitly manipulated this tendency not to complain about one's leader except behind
his back: he hardly left Bagshawe's side during his survey safari.47 Conversely, the superstate
language of representation guaranteed that Bagshawe never tried to speak to Kingalu's subor-
dinates in Kingalu's absence, despite the fact that Kingalu himself had shown how Waluguru
guarded their statements in the presence of superiors. Issues of hereditary representation
constituted the council meetings: at a later baraza, Bagshawe discussed the subchiefship ot
Kasanga, in the presence of the Kingalu, the Matombo subchief Bambarawe, some headmen,
and several candidates for the post. Headmen not appointed by the British were automatically
excluded. More important, there were no women present, despite the fact that the leading
women of a lineage exerted formal political power beyond the selection of suitable successors
to a lineage headmanship. The former subchief of Kasanga, Chambandewa, was a son ot the
prewar Hega, and Kingalu had taken hereditary, matrilineal succession as an excuse to replace
him with his own candidate. The latter, however, was soon deposed for embezzlement, and
Bagshawe had to resolve who was to succeed him, sandwiched as he was between Kingalu's
manipulation of "hereditary" succession and Chambandewa's attempts to resist it. In this
context, it is significant that Bagshawe had no time for Chambandewa when the latter tried on
a later occasion to talk to him alone: Chambandewa was no longer "representative." Thus
Luguru avoidance of moto and British ideas of representation combined to pidginize Luguru
politics.
Kingalu was absent from Bagshawe's council meetings on only one other occasion, and this
may indicate another way in which a discourse of representation pidginized Luguru politics.
Bagshawe sent Kingalu to Morogoro to settle the boundaries of Northern and Southern Uluguru
with Kingo, chief of the North, and went alone to Matombo, where he had a long talk with
Bambarawe and his wandewa:
IBambarawe) does not claim that the ancient Mbambalawe's48 were "over" the local Wandewa, but they
were respected & were rain and war doctors, his uncle, especially, having defeated Wambunga invaders.
All Wandewa ruled their clans in ordinary affairs independently. The Germans made his uncle chief; he
says that if anyone was chief in pre-Cerman days, it was Kingalo [sic] No one has replaced his
(Bambarawe's/pp) family as rain-makers since he became a Christian.'19
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Before his wandewa (including powerful men like Moto, Lwango, Gugulu, and Chamlungu)
and without the presence of Kingalu, Bambarawe stated that they were independent. Then
follows an interesting sentence: "If anyone was chief in pre-German days, it was Kingalo." This
probably helped to convince Bagshawe of Kingalu's "representativeness," but the written
sentence does not give any indication as to how it was spoken. Information gathered in writing
divorces the content of knowledge from its performance. By emphasizing communication as
writing and reading, it elevates visual activity over the oral/aural and tactile production of
knowledge. It thereby reinforces a European language ideology that takes writing as the model
for semiotics, and thereby privileges a discourse of representation (Fabian 1983; Tyler 1984).50
When we add oral/aural activity, however, by emphasizing intonation, the sentence that begins
with "//'anyone was chief. .." may as well be read as a guarded statement about the absence
of chiefs in Uluguru before the German period. (My guess is that Bambarawe did not like to
add, "But no one was.") Speculative as it may be, the example indicates the possibility that the
language of representation intervened even more deeply in the performance of the baraza than
merely determining who should be present.
This is not the only way in which pidginization from a position of power can occur: others
have [jointed to the "brutal" use of the expressive function of language and its tendency to limit
conversation to expressions of command (Samarin 1984:449-450; see alsoCohn 1985; Fabian
1 986:11 2-1.54). "Brutal" expression is related to coercion, however, whereas the privileging of
the referential function in Luguru administrative ethnography enabled collaboration. The two
forms of pidgini/ation could work together: the hesitation and lip-service to government
displayed by Waluguru during the barazas held after the deposition of Kingalu Mwanarubela
show that they found it hard to distinguish between British questions, exhortations, and
commands. But it was the language of tribal representation, translated into the pidgin of "true"
I uguru chiefs, subchiets, and headmen, that enabled indirect rule to penetrate Luguru society
far more deeply than before.
This penetration was made possible initially by the contact situation of the baraza. In a
"traditional" Luguru council meeting the number and variety of positions of the people present
guaranteed a certain practical democracy. The women were there, and although the women
did not speak, the men certainly felt their presence.51 When someone whose opinion was
deemed important was absent, the meeting was often postponed. An administrative baraza,
however, ignored all these "unofficial" or unrepresentative political positions; it had to be
concluded in a single session. The language of hereditary chieftaincies and headmanships
convinced British administrators that this was how such sessions should be performed, a
conviction actively sustained by those Waluguru who, like Kingalu, profited by that language
and tried to keep their political struggles out of the government's eye. In this way, the discourse
on representation created both its representation (the ethnography of Uluguru) and its referent
(the appointed "chief") in one single move.
In addition, the penetration of Luguru society by the language of tribal representation was
sustained through transmission to both Waluguru and future administrators by bureaucratic
reproduction (see Schulte Nordholt 1994). Once identified, the chief or headman was subject
to a hierarchy of command and communication that made him responsible for the accuracy of
the information given to the British official and for the implementation of the policies dictated
by that official. In the practice of the Luguru Native Administration, this implied a constant
repetition of the central tenets of administrative ethnography, reinforcing the hierarchy of
headmen, subchiefs, and chiefs. Most administrators subordinate to or succeeding Hutchins
and Bagshawe never took care to check the earlier ethnography, an oversight that indicates the
power mediated by the written word. The fundamental tendency of bureaucratic thought "to
turn all problems of politics into problems of administration" (Mannheim 1960:105) required
752 american ethnologist
stable representations, which were provided by both the written rcifications of administrative
ethnography and the "chief" as the personified, nonarbitrary sign of Luguru authority.
The stability of this administrative pidgin was nevertheless an illusion, if only because its
contents were interpreted by different groups in different ways. While Bagshawe seemed to
think of the appointed chiefs and headmen as representative of their people (owing to either
the laws of hereditary succession or a simple absence of complaints), subordinate Waluguru
probably thought of the chief as the employee of the government. The stability of "true" or
legitimate political representation as perceived by British administrators, might, instead, be a
stability based on fear of the powerful, for, as I was told in 1990, "we should be afraid of the
government" (tuogope serikali). That brings us, in conclusion, to the systematic instability of
indirect rule.
the paradoxes of pidgin politics
Indirect rule in Uluguru was characterized by a strong tendency toward the reification of
ethnographic representation along legalistic and bureaucratic lines. But no bureaucracy can
keep out politics by decree alone, and this was further complicated by the paradoxes and
contradictions existing among and within substrate, superstrate, and pidgin political discourses.
Above, I have already noted the tension between the standards of hereditary succession and
those of "good government" within administrative anthropology, as well as the tension within
Luguru political discourse between I ukolo discourse and the real molt he exchange of violence,
magic, and gifts. In conclusion, I would like to consider how these tensions reappeared in the
practical implementation of pidgin politics, which created a proliferation of political possibilities
comparable in effect to the addition of a pidgin to the linguistic world of both substrate and
superstrate languages.
As I have demonstrated, the implementation of indirect rule in Uluguru was based, on the
one hand, on the invented offices of chief and subchief (which reified the fluid and transitory
"big man" positions of Kingalu, Hega, Bamabarawe, and Mbago on the grounds of a theory of
political evolution through war- and rainmaking powers) and on the other on the incorporation
of selected Luguru landholders at a lower level of the administration. The instability of the
standards by which appointments were made is evident from the fact that the 15 headmen
appointed in the Matombo area in 1926 had been increased to 21 in 1947.'-' The appointed
headmen often ruled an area much larger than their previous sphere of influence, partly because
headmen who could not speak Swahili were ineligible for office. Moreover, many Waluguru
tried to keep pidgin politics—the representations of administrative ethnography—at a distance
because they were afraid to see their leader, who had to protect clan and land fertility through
a tenuous relationship with his ancestors, compromised by direct subordination to the white
man. Often, sons or cousins of wenye saku were appointed as headmen in the place of their
fathers or uncles. In some places, a rival managed to stage a coup (like Moto—the name is
significant—who displaced his nominal uncle Lwango in Konde). In others, a former jumbe
(headman under German rule) who had settled in the area as a Christian teacher managed to
retain his post (like Marie Pauli in Tawa) with no hereditary rights whatsoever. Bambarawe
joined Kiswira (his own valley) with Gozo into one single headmanship and gave it to his son,
who remained in office until 1928, when Bambarawe's rival Mgombelwa got Gozo back with
Kingalu's help. The seemingly stable representations of Luguru authority by the British thus often
merely covered a series of desperate political fights.
But this stability was also threatened from within the discourse of administrative anthropology.
Its standard of hereditary succession was the core of its theory of tribal representation and topped
the hierarchy of standards of government. As I have shown, however, hereditary succession had
to be weighed against the suitability of the candidate and the will of the people. In practice this
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combination turned out to be difficult to maintain. The history of Native Administration in
Uluguru shows a constant recurrence of warnings and depositions of chiefs and subchiefs, and
at each occurrence the standards of chiefship had to be renegotiated. The deposition of Kingalu
Mwanarubela and the amalgamation of Uluguru under Chief Kingo in 1936 was rationalized
by Hutchins, who argued that "Kingalu was never more than a clan head (Ndewa |s/c]) who
had acquired additional powers locally through the sacerdotal functions of a rain-maker," while
Kingo was the "only real chief" of Uluguru because of his grandfather's conquest of the
Morogoro plains.si Thus, the evolutionary theory, in which rain-making powers were part of
the development of chiefship from the clan stage, gave way to the more Lugardian conception
of rule through conquest. When a successor to Kingo had to be chosen after his death in 1943,
the 19.56 conception of chiefship was again reinterpreted; by this point the chief had not been
appointed by right of succession or of conquest but because he was "the only Chief of any
standing in Uluguru." As the appointment had been reinterpreted as meritocratic, it no longer
followed that his heir should necessarily become chief.54
This occasion marked the demise of Cameron's standards of otherness: despite the incessant
protests of the heirs of Kingo and Kingalu,55 the former was succeeded by Sabu bin Sabu, the
subchief of Mkuyuni, who, as the most efficient native administrator, was appointed on merit
only. Such renegotiation of standards of rule was widespread: the only subchief to continue in
office until his death in 1950 was Bambarawe. His hereditary successors were deposed for
maladministration, tax fraud, or other forms of "corruption," and the next subchief was
appointed on merit. All other incumbents of subchief positions suffered the same fate. What
happened at the level of headmanships was rarely recorded, but the few instances that were
suggest similar processes.sf> Indirect rule, therefore, was caught in the paradox that the standards
of good government along pidginized Luguru lines created bad government along British lines.
This paradoxicality of British standards of colonial rule was probably the cause of the oft-re-
peated complaint by Waluguru that while the German rulers were tough (kali) but explicit, the
British were difficult to understand and ambiguous.57 The British administrator, drawing on a
heterogeneous discourse of colonial rule, was not the social engineer of Cameron's policy of
political evolution but a briculeur reinventing the criteria of good government from occasion
to occasion and thereby giving Africans reason to reflect on the "White Man's Madness"
(w.izimu wa wazungu [Liebenow 1971:143]).
However paradoxical, standards of rule still had to apply, and this was partly achieved by
shifting the burden of representation to Luguru shoulders.58 Often Waluguru had to do the work
of replacing the predominantly horizontal relationships of magical, political, and economic
exchange among lineages with the vertical lines of bureaucratic command and obedience.
When Sabu bin Sabu, the successor to Sultan Kingo, displayed ill feeling against his former rival
Kingalu by refusing him a pension, he was warned by the Provincial Commissioner not to be
concerned with "old political jealousies" but to stick to the "present practical issue"—that is,
to be above, not in, politics.59 Two aspects of Luguru politics were, in contrast to hereditary
succession, particularly inadmissible to British administration: gift giving and magical exchange.
They were kept out, or kept quiet, by defining them negatively as "corruption" or by a more
ambiguous bricolage around the positive, magical, sources of Luguru power.
Gift giving was crucial to Luguru inter- and intraclan relationships and, by implication, to the
position of mwenye saku, but the positions of headman and chief in the Native Administration
were nut meant to be reciprocal/'0 Although Kingalu Mwanarubela certainly used his office to
enrich himself and his family, it is probable that in many other cases the "corruption" of British
standards of rule was occasioned by adherence to Luguru standards of obligation and good
relationship. Tax collection and the implementation of agricultural campaigns—the main tasks
of the headman—were projects foreign to most Waluguru. Many Waluguru must have felt that
the headmen's salaries were earned over their backs and presumably expected something in
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recompense. This may have been more difficult, in lukolo terms, for the legitimate landholder
than for a usurper or alien because the former would have to consider all his existing obligations
as well as what the British asked of him. If the salary of an incumbent subchief without hereditary
rights was, in one case, surrendered to the rightful mwenye saku/'1 we can presume that more
of the spoils of government position were divided in this way. The fact that after 1945
"corruption" became scarcer may not mean that it disappeared but merely that Waluguru had
accommodated to British desires about the public performance of government servants.
Magical powers were even more ambiguous for indirect rule. Steven Feiennan has shown
how persistent and necessary rain-making powers were in Usambara politics (1990). In Uluguru,
Kingalu's status as a rain doctor was first an (evolutionist) argument for, and then against, his
appointment to the chiefship. Uganga ("medicine" or "benevolent magic") was close to
witchcraft and not admissible to the British government; yet it was an important ingredient of
Luguru power relationships (as Hutchins's comments on Kingalu's rainmaking capacities make
clear). The British were forced to deal with its ramifications but preferred to do so offstage. For
instance, the District Commissioner asked the African mayor of Morogoro to accompany sultan
Sabu when the latter toured Uluguru, because the mayor did not believe in magic and could
therefore strengthen the morale of his friend who feared the magic of his political rivals.6-1 Fields
(1982) has shown to what extent British officials themselves were implicated in the practice of
magic, a practice to which their disbelief was peripheral.
Judging from the memoirs of an Agricultural Officer, the number of times British officials went
to a mganga (witch doctor) for divination to find a thief or for medicine to cure a mysterious
disease that did not respond to European treatment was considerable.63 Most of the work in the
realm of unseen political powers, however, had to be done by Africans themselves, and in
particular by traveling medicine hunters. Administrators' initial fear that these large-scale
political movements might imply a recurrence of the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-06 was
overcome by the early 1940s and laid to rest by labeling them "religious."64 In this way, political
magic could continue to function under indirect rule, perhaps bothering Christian missionaries
but causing little practical anxiety to British administrators (Pels, in press: ch. 6).
conclusion
Thus, while I agree with Timothy Mitchell that a European discourse of representation created
an "appearance of order" that tried to mask its own authorship of, and authority over, a "Luguru
tribe," I hope to have shown that it was nor an "order that works by appearance" (Mitchell
1991:60; emphasis added). While administrative ethnography and its bureaucratic reproduction
may sometimes have given British administrators the feeling that they could absent themselves
from political struggle, they had to work hard to keep up the appearance of "indirect" rule, and
they did not succeed without regularly subverting the "tribal" representation of administrative
anthropology by their evolutionist notions about progress toward good government. Conversely,
many Waluguru attempted to defend their existing political routines against the encroachment
of the written representations and embodied representatives of administrative ethnography. For
both parties, administrative ethnography remained a second language, a pidgin that could not
carry the full range of political possibilities of the discursive practices from which it was derived
but that nevertheless complicated and enriched these possibilities. In the end, the paradoxes
and contradictions of indirect rule led to a grave political crisis in the 1950s when the Luguru
Native Administration was attacked directly by those it claimed to "represent" (see Brain 1979).
Shortly afterward, Luguru political life was swept into the channel of African nationalism, a
"shift to the superstrate" of representative democracy that it is tempting to describe as a political
form of "creolization" (cf. Hannerz 1987; jourdan 1991:202). But that story must be addressed
elsewhere.
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1. The archival sources referenced in this article are as follows:
CS—Chief Secretary to the Governor of Tanganyika
DAM—Diocesan Archives Morogoro, in the Bishop Flouse, Morogoro, Tanzania
DC—District Commissioner of the Tanganyikan Administration
PC—Provincial Commissioner of the Tanganyikan Administration
RH—Rhodes House Library, Oxford, United Kingdom
TNA—Tan/ania National Archives, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The "Morogoro District Book" is accessible
on microfilm no. 19
UDSM—University of Dar es Salaam library, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
2. A similar emphasis on true and false representation can be identified in both critical and apologetic
studies of colonial missions (Pels, in press: ch. 1).
3. See Hirschkind 1991:285. See also Mitchell's treatment of Bourdieu's account of the Kabyle house
(Bourdieu 1977:90-91), which makes it into the "other's" play of difference and ignores it was originally
meant as an illustration of a general, rather than culturally specific, theory of practice (Mitchell 1991:48-53).
4. |ohn Iliffe discusses the mutual implication of coloni/ers and colonized in indirect rule politics, but
his territory-wide focus prevents him from studying its mediations in detail (1979:318-341). Feierman
provides one of the few subtle analyses of the colonized's reception of indirect rule, but his account of the
British is disappointing (1990:1 34-1 37).
5. For an elaboration of these terms, see Pels 1994; Pels and Salemink 1994; and Schulte Nordholl 1994.
6. lugard's main contribution to Tanganyikan indirect rule was to support, after his return to England in
191 8, missionary activists who formulated the principle of colonial trusteeship in terms of the "primacy of
African interests" in opposition to (predominantly Kenyan and South African) settler polities, a principle on
which Cameron and his Labour allies drew during their own struggles in the late 1920s (Rennet 1960:357;
Cell 1989; Galley 1974:40).
7. Clifford was a good researcher and an expert on the Malay language. He introduced the post of
secretary of native affairs to the Nigerian administration, an innovation that Cameron also adopted in
Tanganyika to coordinate ethnography (Gailey 1974:49). Clifford wrote in 1922:
Knowledge, sure and unerring knowledge ot the people, of their character, of their point of view, of their
customs, habits, modes of thought, is needed as the solid foundation upon which alone really sound
political work can be reared up; and this has to be garnered slowly, patiently, painfully, little by little, (as
quoted in Kirk-Greene 1965:179]
fi. Anthropological professionali/ation in Britain was first propagated by both academics and former
Indian administrators (see Kuklick 1991:196-199; Pels and Salemink 1994). The debate between Mali-
nowski and Cameron's Chief Secretary, Philip Mitchell, shows the potential tension between the two groups
(Malinowski 1930; Mitchell 1930). While both drew on similar exemplars, professional anthropology was
more influenced by the zoological field expedition and the psychological laboratory (Stocking 1983), while
administrative anthropology's "field" was a bricolage of public school playing field (Heussler 1963), the
hunter's safari (Mackenzie 1987), and the amateur naturalist's scientific interests (Pels 1995). For an
admirable description of how these different influences made a late colonial anthropological "field," see
Schumaker 1993.
9. Cameron claimed that this problem convinced him to institute indirect rule (Gailey 1974:391; also
Ingham 1965:552,571). Dundas, however, wrote that Cameron had already decided upon this policy before
arriving in Tanganyika (Dundas 1955:132).
10. As District Commissioner of Kilimanjaro, Dundas persuaded Wachagga to grow coffee (Ingham
1965:556) and was instrumental in forming the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Union. In due time Dundas
became "Wasahuye-O-Wachagga," an elder of the Chagga; he returned the favor by publishing a history
oHhe Wachagga for the Wachagga, a highly unusual gesture at the time (Dundas 1955:117-128).
11. Compare Cameron's 1934 reformulation of Lugard's "cardinal principle" of indirect rule to the
original (Cameron as quoted in Kirk-Greene 1965:193; Lugard 1970|1919]:296). This reformulation was a
product of Cameron's later years, and less dogmatic on the primacy of chiefs than he had been in his
Tanganyikan dispatches (see Cameron 1937).
1 2. "There is a great deal of work to be accomplished in the way of ascertaining the history of the tribe
affected, their traditional organization, their traditional rulers, their proper boundaries, etc." (TNA 7777: CS
to All Senior Commissioners and Administrative Officers, 5-18-95). This was a form of colonial empiricism
that had rather different, because historicizing, consequences than an earlier, British Indian, form (see
Ludden 1993). Among the dissidents, F.). E. Bagshawe thought that Western influence had been present
for too long to be erased from the minds of the Africans, while Dundas (who knew the German records
better than Cameron) said that the absence of chiefs was a good reason for the institution of the akidas (RH
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s.285: Bagshawe diary, 8-24-27; TNA 7777: Dundas to Scott, 7-3-25). Cameron repeatedly opposed the
view that the Germans had also used some form of indirect rule (TN A 11601 /I :Oldham to Cameron, 2-27-29,
Mitchell to CS, 4-5-29, Kastl to Scott, 10-9-28).
13. TNA 7777: Note for Officer Commanding Troops on Native Administration by C. C. Dundas,
probably 1927.
14. Cameron's 1934 comments on the Hausa-Fulani chiefs installed by Lugard show that he thought this
medieval stage, which emphasi/ed conquest rather than legitimacy, should be skipped by political
engineering (as quoted in Kirk-Greene 1965:193, 195, 205-206).
15. TNA 7777: "Tanganyika Territory. Native Administration," by D. Cameron, 1 -3-27; CS to all Senior
Commissioners and Administrative Officers, 5-18-25; Minute Cameron, no. 28, 6-25-25; Confidential
Circular, Native Administration, 7-16-25; TNA 1733/6: Tanganyika Territory Annual Report, 1925; TNA
61/6: Instruction on Native Administration, in Dundas to All PCs, 8-20-26.
16. Cameron, in Kirk-Greene (1965:193); TNA 61/6: Dundas to All PCs, 2-23-26; TNA 7777: Dundas
to Scott, 7-3-25, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Cameron, 9-1 6-25, CS to all Senior Commissioners
and Administrative Officers, 11 -26-25.
17. Therefore, an alien "native agent" could not try the cases at a Native Court (TNA 7777: Minute
Cameron no. 28, 6-25-25; on "extra-tribal" forms, see TNA 7777: Secretary of Stale for ihe Colonies to
Cameron, 9-16-25).
18. Compare with Public School ideology (see Heussler 1963:95 on the inadvisability of elections in
Tanganyika; TNA 61/6: Dundas to All PCs, 2-23-26). Cameron refused to have Africans on the Legislative
Council because he felt that none of the chiefs were educated enough lo participate and that no educated
African sufficiently represented his people (Gailey 1974:47).
19. TNA 7777: Minute Cameron no. 28, 6-25-25; Confidential Circular on Native Administration,
7-16-25.
20. The "will of the people" seems to have been an addition typical to Dundas, who dratted the circular
(C. Dundas, Draft Circular no. 50, TNA 7790: 7-9-25).
21. The third pillar of native administration, the native treasuries (the first and second being the native
authority and the native court), was more clearly propagandist: it should create ihe impression that people
paid for their own native authority, with only "minor intervention" by the Officer to prevent waste and
corruption. Most Waluguru seem to have thought, however, that the British simply took most of the loot
(TNA 7777: Confidential Circular on Native Administration, 7-16-25; TNA 1733/6: Tanganyika Territory
Annual Report, 1926; Mzee Paulo Josefu Mgundukano, Konde, 11-7-89).
22. See below (and TNA, Morogoro District Book: "TheAkida System," by E. E. Hukhins, 1930; "Iribal
History and Legends, Luguru and Kami Tribe," by E. Hutchins; TNA 7777: CS to Administrative Officer
Morogoro, 8-7-25; TNA 1733/13: Morogoro Annual Report, 1925; TNA 7777: Dundas to Scott. 7-3-25).
Graham mentions that Mitchell, as secretary of native affairs, decided upon the (faulty) constitution of the
Njombe Native Authorities in 1926, which implied bypassing CS Dundas and PC liagshawe (1976:5).
Something similar may have happened in Morogoro.
23. Dundas was made CS (and succeeded by Mitchell as secretary of native affairs), but under Cameron
(who did most work himself) that post did not carry ihe weight of the formally lesser post of secretary of
native affairs. In 1928, there was animosity between Cameron and Dundas (RH s.287: Bagshawe diary,
8-10-28). Contrary to Philip Mitchell, Cameron's favorite, Dundas was not promoted after his lour as CS,
and, while Mitchell became governor of Uganda in 1935, Dundas had to wail until 1937 to get a minor
governorship, that of the Bahamas. Dundas succeeded Mitchell in Uganda in 1940 (Gailey 1974:1 38-1 40).
24. Clans (lukolo [Kiluguru]; ukoo [Swahili]) and lineages (tomho [Kiluguru]; ziwa |Swahili|) are too
important in Luguru society to accept that we should refrain from using the term "lineage" because it does
not represent folk models and because lineages do not organize "vitaI political or economic activities" (Kuper
1982:92; he uses the term lineage model, the "model" aspect of which he fails to explain). Kuper does not
mention Peters (1967), who had formulated Kuper's doubts about the term lineage 15 years earlier.
25. The Agricultural Departmenl dated the settlement of Uluguru later (in 1 884) lo emphasi/e the speed
with which soil erosion took place (TNA, Morogoro District Book: "Soil Erosion in the Uluguru Mountains,'
A. H. Savile, 4-24-47). Waluguru list up lo 15 successors to a lineage headmanship, which makes this
unlikely. Fosbrooke, taking 20 years for one generation, arrived at 1660 as the approximate year of entry
(Young and Fosbrooke 1960:21), but ignored succession by brothers. In Kingalu's genealogy. Hutch ins listed
six instances of brolherly succession (TNA, Morogoro District Book: "Tribal History and Legends, Luguru
and Kami Tribe"). Of the 12 Kingalus (Fosbrooke: ca. 240 years) thai could be listed in 1960, therefore, six
generations disappear (minus 120 years), which would put the time of Kingalu I at around 1840. He,
however, was a latecomer. Cory's guess (no evidence supplied) of approximately 1800 seems to be closest
lo the truth (UDSM: Cory Paper 430).
26. I cannot go into this history in detail. For further information see Mzuanda 1958; UDSM: Cory paper
430; Wendelini n.d.
27. TNA, Morogoro District Book: "Tribal History and Legends: Luguru and Kami Tribe," by E. Hutchins.
28. The theory was shared by Cameron, Dundas, Mitchell, and others (TNA 7777: CS to Senior
Commissioners Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Lindi and Administrative Officers Bagamoyo and Pangani, 1-26-26;
Dundas to Scotl, 7-3-25). It was slill held in substantially the same way in the 1950s, although by them
Evans-Pritchard's "segmentary lineage systems" further legitimated its theoretical underpinnings (Young and
Fosbrooke 1960:41-43).
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29. I will use rnwenye saku for traditional authority, reserving mndewa for the neotraditional bureaucratic
positions created by the British. Waluguru still follow the same usage.
30. This was the case in the valley of Konde (Mzee Mahumbo, Konde, 10-15-89).
31. An example was Shenekambi, son of Kingalu Mwanashaa (the sixth; TNA 61/1/3: Hutchins to PC,
7-15-31).
32. All wenye ;'ss/ and wenye saku were wenye mlunga, but not all wenye mlunga were members of the
landholding clan; some earned their titles on merit.
33. Hutchins (RH s. 1059: "The Waluguru," p. 2) mentions Mbago's tricks with a looking glass acquired
in Bagarnoyo. Debenham mentions an alliance, around 1860, between Kingalu I and Mwinyimkuu of
Bagamoyo (TNA, Morogoro District Book: "Tribal History and Legends, Luguru and Kami Tribe"); it is more
likely, however, that this is Kingalu Fimbombili IV who, according to Fosbrooke, died on the coast (Young
and Fosbrooke 1960:48).
34. Brain provides two versions of the story (1971), one from Mzuanda (1958:9-16) and the second,
recorded by himself in Kinole. Unfortunately, his amalgamation of euhemerist, functionalist, and structuralist
approaches misses the historical and dysfunctional importance of the two versions.
35. Mleke was a Mbena and a Magoma, according to the second version of the story recounted by Brain,
a Mnyagatwa. The present Magoma of Tegetero calls himself Mnyani; according to Mzuanda, Wanyagatwa
and Wanyani are the same (1958:78-80).
36. Mzee Magoma Mwanamtali (Tegetero, I -16-90) said that Kingalu could not have betrayed Magoma,
as he was Magoma's tnjukuu (grandchild). Given the fact that Magoma married the first Kingalu's sister (who
only had daughters, which meant that the name of Kingalu could only go to her grandchild), Mzee Magoma
may have wanted to convince me of his seniority over Kingalu in terms of kinship discourse.
37. When I had been cheated out of a considerable sum by my first research guide, I was rather taken
aback by the admiration with which my best friends alluded to him: amcfaulu, "he has succeeded."
38. Mzee Mahumbo, Konde, 10-15-89.
39. The Matornbo Mission diary shows that DC Hutchins used the same method, using the mission as
base (DAM: Matombo Diary, 11-18-25; for Bagshawe's work, TNA 18913: Uluguru Land Development
Survey Report, 1931; RH s.288: Bagshawe diary).
40. RH s.288: Bagshawe Diary, Vol. XI, December 1929 -)anuary 1930.
41. TNA 18913: Land Development Survey report, Uluguru Mountains, 1931:4.
42. TNA 11676/1: Ann. Rep. Eastern Province, 1927; TNA 11676/11: Ann. Rep. Eastern Province, 1928;
TNA, Morogoro District Book: "Tribal History and Legends, Luguru tribe," by E. Hutchins, notes of 2-17-28
and 7-7-28; DAM: Matombo Diary, 10-27-28.
43. TNA 23841: PC Eastern Province to CS, 2-14-36.
44. TNA 23841: PC Eastern Province to CS, 2-14-36
45. TNA 23841: PC Eastern Province to CS, 6-30-36; PC Eastern Province to CS, 9-4-36; CS to Attorney
General, 9-14-36.
46. Hutchins relates how in 1925, when Kingalu and Hega first met each other during a government
baraza, they covered their faces, because looking at each other would have meant instant death. Although
Hutchins wrote that they were later persuaded to give up the "superstition," it is more likely that they
reinterpreted the efficacy of their magic (RH s. 1059: "The Waluguru", E. Hutchins).
47. In addition, Kingalu took the opportunity to emphasize his importance in his subordinates' eyes by
being carried in a chair, heralded by drums and pipes into each location visited by Bagshawe. This earned
Kingalu's retinue the name of "Alexander's Rag Time Band" from Agricultural Officer Hill.
48. This is Bagshawe's usage; most of my informants spelled it "Bambarawe." (The "I" and "r," different
in Swahili, are not distinguished in Kiluguru.)
49. RH s.288: Bagshawe Diary, vol. XI. January 20, 1930.
50. For an overview of language ideology, see Woolard and Schieffelin 1994, particularly the references
listed under literacy (1994:65) and European ideologies of referentiality (1994:71).
51. For the political role of Luguru women see Pels in press: chapter 4.
52. Cf. Bales's remark about the proliferation of "tribes" in Tanganyika (1965:631), and Thomas's
observation that the ethnographic genre, by "localizing questions" (1991:312) leads to a similar proliferation
(cf. Pardon 1990; for Luguru headmanships: Mzee Morisi Martini, Kiswira, 8-14-89; MzeeZongera, Mtamba,
2-8-90; TNA 31 347: Page-Jones to CS, 5-9-47).
53. TNA 23841: Hulchins to PC Eastern Province, .3-19-36.
54. TNA, Morogoro District Book: "The appointment of Mzee Sabu as Sultan of Uluguru," by D.S.
O'Callaghan, 5-9-44.
55. In this they kept drawing on the standard of hereditary office, often by claiming the example of the
British royal family (see Feierman 1990:135; Ranger 1 980; TNA 26/220/11, passim).
56. For subchiefs: TNA, Morogoro District Book: passim; an example of successive headmen is the
Mgombelwa's lineage in Kisem: TNA 26/220/11: passim.
57. For the Germans, in the succinct words of Chief Patrick Kunambi's father, "black was black and white
was while" (Patrick Kunambi, Dar es Salaam, 4-1 2-89).
58. The expression is borrowed from Tagg (1988).
59. The missionary Otto Raum (supported by Charles Dundas) made a similar observation in Uchagga:
he said that a salary made a chief independent of the horizontal obligations maintained by a politics of
tribute. Philip Mitchell dismissed the issue by saying he did "not understand the fuss" (TNA 11601/1: Dundas
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to Cameron, 12-14-28, Mitchell to Cameron, 12-29-28; for Sabu, see TNA 26/220/11: PC Eastern Province
to D.C. Morogoro, 8-9-48).
60. This is confirmed by the clear distinction that Waluguru make between (government) wandewa and
"traditional" wenye issior wenyesaku, while recognizing that mndewj was their traditional term tor both.
61. RH s.288: Bagshawe Diary, Vol. XI, December 1929; January 1930.
62. Mzee Sharif Dossi Salim, Morogoro, 2-11-90.
63. A. H. Savile, "Recollections, 1928-1954" (RH s.1840). At least one administrator believed in the
magic of the medicine hunter Ngoja bin Kimeta (TNA 12333: Dundas to Cameron, 6-2-28). Missionaries
had a similarly ambiguous relationship with magic (see Pels in press: chapter 6).
64. Compare the fears about Maji Maji in the papers on Ngoja (TNA 12333: passim) svith the Mahenge's
District Officer's comparison of Christianity and witch finding in 1943 (TNA 61/128/11: DC Mahenge to PC
Eastern Province, 3-22-43).
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